

## The End of Alliances? Not So Fast

The traditional U.S. alliance system, comprised of nearly 100 formal treaty arrangements and security commitments that the United States negotiated and maintained during the last half century, has been one of the defining features of post-World War II U.S. foreign and national security strategy. Once considered force multipliers, some now see these arrangements as deadweight anchors that effectively slow U.S. response time to urgent challenges and reduce U.S. freedom of movement in the international arena in the post-September 11 environment. This view has led to increasingly frequent arguments that the post-World War II U.S. alliance system is in fast decline, if not already dead.

In a new strategic age and in the face of pressing security challenges, are traditional alliances losing their relevance? The U.S. alliance system is neither dead nor necessarily in decline, but rather, its nature and purpose are changing in response to the challenges of a new era. The emerging U.S. alliance system, constructed in part from the rich legacy of post-World War II alliances, is predictably quite different from what it was during the Cold War. It may also result in greater burdens on the United States. New trends suggest greater reliance on ad hoc coalitions (“of the willing”) that can be assembled rapidly and on countries that might possess greater enthusiasm for U.S. aims but have less capability and experience than traditional U.S. partners. The new global context of inchoate and multifaceted international challenges in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland calls for new security structures—no question. Yet, the added flexibility afforded by ad hoc coalitions is likely to be offset by the burdens of greater U.S. military responsibility and less-able partners.

---

Kurt M. Campbell is senior vice president and director of the International Security Program as well as the Henry A. Kissinger Chair in International Security at CSIS. The author would like to thank Richard Weitz, Celeste Johnson Ward, and Margaret Cosentino for their assistance in producing this manuscript.

---

© 2004 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
*The Washington Quarterly* • 27:2 pp. 151–163.

## **Are Alliances Useful?**

---

The reasons for the supposed descent of alliances into irrelevance (or less relevance) are much debated. Some argue that the Bush administration's penchant for unilateralist action has alienated traditional U.S. allies. These analysts point to the apparent U.S. preference for informal associations that can be assembled for ad hoc purposes rather than acting through highly structured and formal relationships that carry with them historical baggage and cumbersome procedures.<sup>1</sup>

Other observers assert that the trend toward greater U.S. autonomy in conducting U.S. security policy is more structural than personal and results primarily from the unique burdens of being the sole superpower. These analysts argue that previous U.S. administrations demonstrated clear signs of U.S. independence of action on occasion and stress that the urgent demands of the post-September 11 world have served simply as a catalyst for accelerating existing structural conditions that favor greater U.S. independence in conducting its activities abroad.<sup>2</sup>

Yet another group of strategists suggests that the malaise in U.S. relations with established allies is not attributable to policies of the United States but to its allies' inaction, torpor, and free-riding tendencies in the face of the pressing and unavoidable security challenges dominant in the era of the war on terrorism. These authors support the Bush administration's reliance on a policy of "cherry picking" (engaging coalitions of willing allies on a case-by-case basis) because they believe that only some countries—and even then only some of the time—have been both willing and able to support needed U.S. policies to combat terrorism and promote international security.<sup>3</sup>

Finally, another school of thought claims that the entire debate has been exaggerated. Proponents of this view argue that, despite some obvious tensions with certain long-standing allies—hardly a new phenomenon—in its efforts to address a host of critical international issues, the United States continues to nurture and operate through existing alliance structures, which include elements of "Old Europe" (Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's dismissive reference to France and Germany) as well as a number of new alliance partners in Eastern Europe and elsewhere.<sup>4</sup>

Although recent trends undoubtedly suggest departures from previous U.S. practices, all these schools of thought assume that a clear, uniform trend has emerged that will determine the fundamental fate and future of alliances in U.S. strategic planning. Yet, one has not; rather, the nature of the U.S. alliance system remains largely in flux. Some traditional alliances, notably bilateral ones, are thriving and continue to be central to the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign and security policy, while other bilateral ties appear to be languishing in the face of either neglect or strate-

gic drift by either or both alliance partners. In addition, increased interaction with and utilization of new alliance partners, notably in central Europe, are evident in operations used to conduct the global war on terrorism.

Although some larger multilateral alliances, such as NATO, have even demonstrated some high-profile signs of drift, such as the fracas over Iraq, this trend is by no means uniform. Other instances, such as NATO's role to facilitate essential transatlantic cooperation in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and elsewhere, may reveal a broader, sustained, and continuing pattern of cooperation.<sup>5</sup> Conclusions of the demise or indisputable relevance of alliances are premature.

### **The Security Inheritance**

---

The more relevant question then is not whether alliances are dead but rather how they are adapting to new exigencies and conditions. Many traditional alliances were created over the last 50 years or more as vehicles to provide a formal security guarantee by the United States and to facilitate rapid U.S. intervention in the face of foreign aggression, which at various times threatened to come from the Soviet Union and/or the People's Republic of China.

During that time, the United States assembled important, formalized security relationships with virtually half of the world's countries and pledged to defend nearly 50 treaty allies in the event of an attack, primarily to support a strategy of containing communism, which included assistance in major conflicts such as those in Korea and Vietnam. Some such alliances have been multilateral, most notably NATO, though others were attempted, such as the ill-fated Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), but most were bilateral arrangements between the United States and countries in all regions throughout the globe.

In Europe, the levels of military, political, and diplomatic coordination and cooperation in NATO, established in April 1949 to provide a security umbrella for 16 democratic Western European nations, proved without historical precedent. In Northeast Asia, the United States established deeply rooted bilateral alliances with Japan and South Korea that provided the anchor for the U.S. presence and leverage to fight the Cold War in that region. In Southeast Asia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia became important U.S. partners in containing the spread of communism. Australia has been a key long-term ally, first in the multilateral alliance with the United States and New Zealand and later in a bilateral context. In the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia, the United States developed strong bilateral relationships with Israel, Egypt, Iran (before 1979), Saudi

Arabia, the Gulf states, and Pakistan to combat Soviet advances. Finally, U.S. alliances with an array of states in Africa and Latin America formed a bulwark against Soviet designs in each region.

The U.S. government clearly has not treated all alliances and all allies equally. In the Asia-Pacific region, for example, SEATO, initiated in 1955 by the United States to check Communist expansion in the Pacific and including Great Britain, France, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan,

Australia, and New Zealand, dissolved in 1977, but the security commitment to Thailand actually remains in force. Until quite recently, New Zealand and the Philippines were considered less important to U.S. global strategy, given the former's allergies to U.S. nuclear policy and the latter's decision to request U.S. military withdrawal from key military facilities. Yet, these two relationships have been refracted through

**Increased interaction with and utilization of new alliance partners are evident.**

the new prism of the war on terrorism: New Zealand is actively assisting U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, in Iraq while the Philippines has emerged as a main front in the struggle against violent Islamic fundamentalism in Southeast Asia. Singapore and Taiwan both have complex but very different unofficial security ties with the United States, and in both cases, although for very different reasons, these ties are improving.

In terms of U.S. national security, the significance of some regions has clearly diminished since the end of the Cold War. In Latin America, the United States has reduced its security presence and strategic engagement, and the U.S. government now maintains no formal security ties with states in sub-Saharan Africa. Now that the Soviet threat is gone, some U.S. allies are clearly more likely than others to continue to help the United States defend common Western interests by playing important roles in key regions such as the Balkans or the Gulf. Some of these governments—Japan, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Turkey—have provided key military bases and access agreements throughout the Cold War and after as part of a broader commitment to a security community. Others—South Korea, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia—have also provided bases for U.S. forces, either during the Cold War, after, or both, but more out of direct self-interest and self-preservation.

Developing the U.S. alliance system over the course of the last half century has also included cultivating U.S. relations with a number of countries—most of them in the Middle East and the Gulf—that are essentially

the equivalent of U.S. allies in that the United States takes a major interest in their security. Israel is the primary example. Even though the United States has never fought alongside Israeli forces and there is no formal security arrangement, the U.S. government has resupplied them during combat, sought to send strong deterrent messages in support of Israel during regional hostilities, and otherwise made it clear that Washington would not allow Israel to be threatened.

U.S. relations with Jordan, Egypt, and the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman—also probably can be characterized as a more informal alliance relationship. U.S. commitments to GCC member states first began to resemble a collective defense agreement after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, and the arrangement truly reached quasi-alliance status after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. In fact, although not formalized by treaty arrangements, U.S. security interests in the Gulf, particularly in the wake of military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, have become perhaps more important and intense than those in any other region of the globe.

The United States also maintains quasi-colonial security responsibilities toward a host of Pacific nations, such as the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, the Marshall Islands, Palau, and the Federated States of Micronesia (as well as Guam and American Samoa). Finally, the United States has established military training and cooperation programs, security dialogues, and/or limited exchange programs with many of the world's remaining countries. Some of these programs, such as the U.S. security presence in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan since Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, are quite significant, if informal and of uncertain duration. Other training missions and military exchange programs are of little note except for the fact that they involve the host state's interaction with the most powerful military power on the planet.

Such security relationships have often been more fluid than formal alliances have been, which, despite their formality, themselves clearly wax and wane from era to era (or sometimes even cease to exist). Examples include the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), adopted in 1954 by Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Great Britain, and the United States and one of the least successful U.S.-created Cold War alliances, only lasting nominally until the Iranian Revolution in 1979, as well as the formal U.S. commitments to the security of Iran, Pakistan, and Taiwan. Although the primary purpose for the security architecture that the current U.S. administration has inherited has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War and then again since September 11, 2001, most of the parts (i.e., the specific alliances) that comprise it are still intact and can serve useful purposes in a new strategic era.

## The Cold War Typology of Alliances

---

Instead of identifying U.S. alliances regionally or in terms of the formality of the security arrangement, classifying alliances according to the closeness of the country's relationship with the United States during the height of the Cold War (and identifying the reasons for this closeness) illustrates the changing but not declining nature of the U.S. alliance system. Beyond the rather zoological classifications illustrated in the preceding discussion, it is useful to think of traditional U.S. alliances within three broad categories:

the nuclear family, the extended family, and friends and acquaintances.

**Conclusions of the demise or indisputable relevance of alliances are premature.**

Throughout most of the Cold War, those U.S. allies that comprised what can be called the nuclear family included NATO members, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia. Although some of these alliances involved a formal U.S. nuclear umbrella, the term "nuclear family" is meant to include those states that comprised an inner circle.

These states or multilateral groupings were typically on the front lines in the face of the Soviet threat and represented the strongest U.S. alliances, sharing several common features.

First, these nuclear-family states were included, formally or informally, under the U.S. nuclear umbrella; in several cases, by treaty arrangement, extended U.S. deterrence protected them from nuclear-armed aggression. Second, these states served as hosts to large numbers of U.S. military forces, and both partners demonstrated a high degree of military cooperation, joint planning, joint training, and interoperability. In addition, Washington provided major military equipment to these states. Each case also exhibited a significant degree of interaction, including multigenerational people-to-people exchanges at every level—diplomatic, technical, military, and cultural. Finally, over time, these alliances developed established procedures, habits of cooperation, codes of conduct, and expectations of behavior. During the course of the Cold War, the United States invested enormous amounts of financial and political capital in these relationships. Maintaining and tending to them came to be seen as the bedrock of the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.

During much of the Cold War, the extended family arguably included Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Taiwan, Colombia, and South Africa. The extended family represents a more diverse assortment of relationships that differed from each other in

several important respects. Israel, for example, is a key partner. Although not a formal ally like those discussed above, it may be closer to being a member of the nuclear family than any of the other extended-family states are in terms of the levels of cooperation and commitment that the United States has devoted to its defense. U.S. relations with Indonesia and Pakistan, on the other hand, have seen far more ups and downs and greater ambivalence on one or both sides at various times.

Still, U.S. alliances with these countries shared some common features that make this category useful. First, an enormous degree of cooperation was evident on a number of levels over time (though not quite as much as with the core members of the nuclear family). Rather than being on the front lines of a direct potential military threat from the Soviet Union, the extended family provided a foothold for U.S. influence and outposts aimed to blunt Communist expansion and to advance U.S. interests in key regions. Many members of the extended family received substantial amounts of U.S. aid, military training and equipment, and military-to-military cooperation. Even though some extended-family states, such as Bahrain, hosted U.S. military forces, U.S. presence in these countries was generally far more modest than it was in states that were members of the nuclear family.

The third Cold War category of friends and acquaintances included those countries without formal security arrangements or regular interactions with the United States. The United States developed an array of bilateral relationships with these other states in key regions, again primarily aimed at confronting the Soviet Union in a global context. Some of these states included nondemocratic, authoritarian regimes in Latin America, such as Chile, that provided bulwarks against Communist encroachment but often had appalling human rights records, thus making it difficult truly to engage them in a deep alliance at a state-to-state level. Most of these relationships were of transitory importance, and the rationale for maintaining these ties faded with the diminishing imperatives of the Cold War.

## Reconceptualizing Alliances

---

During the 2000 U.S. presidential campaign, George W. Bush focused on traditional U.S. alliances as a central feature of U.S. engagement in the world and as an essential multiplier for U.S. global activism. Candidate Bush singled out traditional members of the nuclear family as especially important. In the spring that year, an adviser to the Bush campaign and the future national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, wrote in *Foreign Affairs* that a Republican administration should “renew strong and intimate relationships with allies who share American values and can thus share the burden of

promoting peace, prosperity, and freedom.” She described NATO as “America’s most important strategic alliance.” Underscoring the importance of traditional U.S. alliances in Asia, Rice declared that “never again should an American president go to Beijing for nine days and refuse to stop in Tokyo or Seoul” (as President Bill Clinton had done in 1998).<sup>6</sup>

The subsequent Bush administration, however, has provoked an enormous amount of public commentary about the supposed lack of U.S. consultation and coordination with, as well as commitment to, these formal alliance partners. Many have criticized the Bush administration for not following Rice’s prescription. Even before September 11, 2001, the United States was accused of arrogant behavior; during the last three years, “unilateral” has become a nearly universal label for U.S. foreign policy. Most of this concern has focused on how Washington has dealt with traditional U.S. allies in the old nuclear family, especially NATO members.

The reality is that we are currently seeing a change in U.S. alliances or, more precisely, a change in emphasis among the many alliances. In the face of new kinds of security concerns, the United States has in fact given more value to those alliances that can reliably support U.S. interests in the war on terrorism and participate decisively in coalitions of the willing. Some of this change in emphasis predated the war on terrorism, but the attacks of September 11, 2001, served as a catalyst to accelerate preexisting proclivities. Like most wars, the global war on terrorism has stimulated the rethinking of old relationships, created new ones—some of them with features that are quite different from traditional alliances in the nuclear family—and, in some cases, given lower priority to inherited alliances that have less relevance to meet current global challenges.

The structure of U.S. relationships for the global war on terrorism is not yet entirely clear. A great deal will depend on the overall trajectory of Washington’s grand strategy over the course of the next decade and beyond, as well as on external events, including the future of North Korea, the outcome of U.S. efforts to stabilize and democratize Iraq, and the reorientation of NATO and its connection to any defense capability developed by the European Union. The broad outlines of things to come, however, may already be visible and can be classified in a new typology of three categories of U.S. alliances: a new nuclear family, new friends, and flings.

Great Britain,<sup>7</sup> Australia, Poland, Spain, Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Japan are part of a core group of states that forms the basis of a new international cohort that has generally worked closely with the United States in the war on terrorism. Some traditional U.S. alliances are thriving, while others have not fared as well, and some new members have been elevated to this inner circle in the new strategic environment. The big-

gest questions for the future remain transatlantic relations, the long-term impact of the fracas over Iraq, and the course NATO will take over the next two decades.<sup>8</sup>

For the moment, a new nuclear family for the United States seems to be emerging, one primarily comprised of bilateral relationships and that differentiates between particular states within NATO. Whereas U.S. alliances with Spain, Poland, and other states are vigorous and growing, U.S. relations with Germany and France are seemingly at a nadir, as shown, for example, by the reluctance of Germany and France to support the U.S.-led military intervention in Iraq.<sup>9</sup> Relations with other non-European, traditional members of the nuclear family are also troubled. The alliance between the United States and South Korea is in bad shape, and it is unclear how it might be repaired. Indeed, the relationship may already have taken on less significance and become relegated to the ash heap of old alliance partnerships, given the difficulties in finding common ground for how to deal with North Korea.<sup>10</sup>

**It is useful to think of traditional U.S. alliances within three broad categories.**

The new nuclear family is likely to be smaller than the old one was, in part because of the current emphasis on bilateralism and in part because fewer states now seem willing to take the steps required to remain in that category. This new nuclear family will also have different features. In addition, the new nuclear-family relationships arise out of shared values and views, rather than being bound by common threats and thrown together haphazardly—either by fate or geography or both. Finally, members such as Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and Australia that are not already major hosts to U.S. forces may become regions in which the United States seeks to train and/or deploy forward-based U.S. military forces in the future so that U.S. military assets are better placed to deal with the threats of the new era.<sup>11</sup> These special friends have received clear perks from the United States, including high-level diplomatic attention, special preferences on trade deals, and the right to bid on expensive contracts in the postconflict reconstruction mission in Iraq.

The United States has also developed closer relations with a diverse set of global actors that might be termed “new friends.” These states may have had preexisting relations with the United States but now find themselves drawn more closely to the United States largely because of the new strategic conditions of the war on terrorism. These new friends include India, the Philippines, Uzbekistan, Bahrain, Jordan, and Singapore. A few of these states have been designated as “non-NATO strategic allies” (Bahrain and

the Philippines, for example) as a testament to their newly found significance for the United States. All of them represent critical regional access points for the U.S. military and other forms of presence—sometimes in a strictly geographical sense—in areas of potential instability and lawlessness, as well as sites that might be breeding grounds for terrorism. Military-to-military interactions with each of these countries have increased sharply in the last few years, and the U.S. government has used several of these states as staging areas for operations against local terrorist groups.

The importance of several of these states to U.S. global strategy continues to increase, especially in the case of India,<sup>12</sup> and only the inhibitions of domestic politics in some of these new friends are likely to keep these relationships from blossoming further. Healthy debates are already underway in several of these states about just how far those countries should proceed into Washington's grasp, a sentiment that often suggests a postcolonial mind-set and anxieties about entrapment.

Since September 11, 2001, the United States has also engaged in some dalliances with other important international players that resemble flings, at least at this stage, more than well-established friendships or bilateral alliances. The flings include relationships with China, Russia, Pakistan, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Saudi Arabia. Despite the tremendous diversity among this group of states, whose histories with the United States and strategic outlooks differ significantly, each either has been forced or has chosen to work more closely with Washington in a tactical sense since the onset of the war on terrorism. Just how sustainable or deep this cooperation will be is not clear in any of these cases, given the temporary nature of each of these bilateral interactions.

Among these countries, the U.S. relationship with China is clearly one of the more important. Although Sino-U.S. relations are currently exceptional, the erratic history of ties between Washington and Beijing suggests that there is a possibility that difficulties could arise even in these new international circumstances.<sup>13</sup> The same general point can be made about U.S. relations with Russia, which have enjoyed better times under Bush and President Vladimir Putin than many had anticipated.

## **The Limits of the New U.S. Approach to Alliances**

---

The recent change in the composition and mode of interaction of U.S. relations with its new set of bilateral alliance partners serves as at least an early indication of a significant departure from the past practices that have put NATO at the center of U.S. global diplomatic enterprises. The new U.S. approach, albeit still largely undefined, has allowed Washington to overcome some of the typical burdens of multilateral military alliances and enabled it

to assemble coalitions rapidly as well as dictate the terms for members to complete urgent tasks. Evident risks and difficulties, however, come with this approach.<sup>14</sup>

There is clearly a stark difference, for example, between the coalition of the willing that is currently operating in Iraq and the coalition that operated in the 1991 Gulf War. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States has carried a greatly disproportionate military and financial burden, despite the apparent size of the coalition (nearly 40 states are involved in one way or another). The magnitude and likely duration of the U.S. military presence in Iraq has also significantly reduced Washington's ability to respond elsewhere militarily. In 1991 the military burdens were more distributed and certainly much shorter. Moreover, the alienation of traditional allies has meant that U.S. taxpayers have had to assume most of the costs associated with postconflict reconstruction in Iraq.

**We are currently seeing a change in emphasis among the many U.S. alliances.**

For the United States, using short-term coalitions assembled for specific purposes also risks losing the habits of cooperation and deep engagement that characterized the operating style of NATO during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. Such sustained cooperation has residual benefits that should not be overlooked. NATO has brought benefits to its members in enhanced weapons procurement policies and in other areas not directly related to specific military operations.<sup>15</sup> The almost singular U.S. focus on conducting the war on terrorism has crowded out other global issues of mutual concern and has arguably reduced cooperation, in NATO but also elsewhere, in crucial arenas including transnational challenges in the environmental and health fields. Some have argued that the Bush administration's focus on the war on terrorism threatens to undermine other important U.S. goals, such as economic reform and democratization in Latin America.<sup>16</sup>

Finally, the very public and undiplomatic way in which the Bush administration has occasionally managed differences in global approaches between the United States and some old friends may actually impair Washington's ability to wage the war on terrorism effectively. After the events of September 11, 2001, much of the world rallied behind U.S. efforts to combat terrorism through military intervention in Afghanistan.<sup>17</sup> Yet, the White House's subsequent, largely unilateral approach toward Iraq alienated many of these nations and deprived the United States of the support in the United Nations that could have enhanced the legitimacy of U.S. military and postconflict stability operations in Iraq.<sup>18</sup> In light of the importance of human intelligence

to combat terrorism, the damage that has been done to the goodwill and close cooperation among the intelligence services of several countries with which the United States now has strained ties is of particular concern.<sup>19</sup> Beyond intelligence sharing, allied governments have made extensive contributions to efforts to counter terrorism including border control and blocking terrorists' access to financial assets.

Ultimately, it is uncertain how long the Bush administration's new hierarchy of security associations based almost solely on cooperation with U.S. plans for waging a global war on terrorism will endure. Operation Iraqi Freedom may well represent the nadir in U.S. relations with its traditional allies. The United States and France and Germany privately regret certain approaches prior to operations in Iraq, as demonstrated by both sides' recent efforts to work together to relieve post-Saddam Iraq of some of the financial burdens accrued under the dictator.

In sum, it is too early to declare that alliances have no utility in U.S. strategic planning. It is not too early, however, to determine that their role will be different. Relying exclusively on global coalitions of the willing gives the United States maximum flexibility but in exchange for a larger share of the burdens, usually military. Except in the most extreme circumstances, from the points of view of the United States and the international community, this exchange may not be worthwhile. Alliances will look and act differently than they used to, but they are not dead yet.

## Notes

---

1. See Ronald D. Asmus, "Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs* 42, no. 4 (September/October 2003); Bruce W. Jentleson, "Tough Love Multilateralism," *The Washington Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (winter 2003–04): 7–24; Robert O. Keohane, "Allies Count, After All," *News and Observer*, October 2, 2003; Richard Norton-Taylor, "A Lamé Duck?" *Guardian*, May 22, 2003; Clyde Prestowitz, "Going It Alone," *Chicago Tribune*, August 17, 2003.
2. See Steven E. Meyer, "Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO," *Parameters* 33, no. 4 (winter 2003–04): 83–97.
3. See Clive Crook, "American Diplomacy and the Shape of the World," *National Journal*, January 3, 2004; Frank Gaffney Jr., "A Non-Starter," *Washington Times*, November 25, 2003; John C. Hulsman, "European Arrogance and Weakness Dictate Coalitions of the Willing," *Heritage Lectures*, no. 777, December 19, 2002, pp. 5–6.
4. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Perspectives," *Strategic Survey: 2002/3* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 5–15; Colin L. Powell, "A Strategy of Partnerships," *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 1 (January/February 2004): 22–34.
5. Rebecca Johnson and Micah Zenko, "All Dressed Up and No Place to Go: Why NATO Should Be on the Front Lines in the War on Terror," *Parameters* 33, no. 4 (winter 2003–04): 48–63.

6. Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 1 (January/February 2000): 45–62.
7. See James K. Wither, "British Bulldog or Bush's Poodle? Anglo-American Relations and the Iraq War," *Parameters* 33, no. 4 (winter 2003–04): 67–82.
8. See Dalia Dassa Kaye, "Bound to Cooperate? Transatlantic Policy in the Middle East," *The Washington Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (winter 2003–04): 179–195; Robert E. Hunter, "Europe's Leverage," *The Washington Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (winter 2003–04): 91–110.
9. See Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Gulf War: The German Resistance," *Survival* 45, no. 1 (spring 2003): 99–116; Jacquelyn K. Davis, *Reluctant Allies and Competitive Partners: U.S.-French Relations at the Breaking Point?* (Herndon, Va.: Brassey's, 2003).
10. See Seung-Hwan Kim, "Anti-Americanism in Korea," *The Washington Quarterly* 26, no. 1 (winter 2002–03): 109–122.
11. See Kurt M. Campbell and Celeste Johnson Ward, "New Battle Stations?" *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 5 (September/October 2003).
12. See Teresita C. Schaffer, "Building a New Partnership with India," *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (spring 2002): 31–44.
13. Aaron L. Friedberg, "11 September and the Future of Sino-American Relations," *Survival* 44, no. 1 (spring 2002): 33–50; Jing-Dong Yuan, "Sino-U.S. Military Relations Since Tiananmen: Restoration, Progress, and Pitfalls," *Parameters* 33, no. 1 (spring 2003): 51–67.
14. See James P. Thomas, *The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
15. Ethan B. Kapstein, "Allies and Armaments," *Survival* 44, no. 2 (summer 2002): 141–155.
16. See Jorge G. Castaneda, "The Forgotten Relationship," *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 3 (May/June 2003): 67–81.
17. Paul Dibb, "The Future of International Coalitions: How Useful? How Manageable?" *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (spring 2002): 131–132.
18. See William J. Durch, "Picking Up the Peaces: The UN's Evolving Postconflict Roles," *The Washington Quarterly* 26, no. 4 (autumn 2003): 195–210. On the broader role of the United Nations in combating terrorism, see Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, "Combating Terrorism," *The Washington Quarterly* 26, no. 4 (autumn 2003): 163–176.
19. See Michael Ignatieff, "Why Are We in Iraq? (And Liberia? And Afghanistan?)" *New York Times Magazine*, September 7, 2003. See also Jentleson, "Tough Love Multilateralism," pp. 9–10.

