North Korea: the Next Generation - Jonathan D. Pollack

Kim Jong-il’s Clenched Fist

Jonathan D. Pollack is a professor of Asian and Pacific Studies and chairman of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group at the NavalWar College. He can be reached at jonathan.d.pollack@gmail.com.


North Korea’s second nuclear test on May 25, 2009 was the centerpiece of its policy retrogression. According to preliminary U.S. estimates, the test had an explosive yield appreciably greater than the first nuclear test of October 2006. Though the explosion did not constitute definitive evidence of a deliverable weapon, Kim Jong-il had unambiguously tethered North Korea’s long-term security to nuclear weapons development, not to any presumed benefits that denuclearization might provide. By invalidating all prior agreements, by pledging to expand and diversify its extant capabilities, and by conducting a nuclear explosion again, the DPRK returned denuclearization to square one, but with Pyongyang possessing meaningful nuclear capabilities that it did not have at the outset of the Bush administration. In the aftermath of the test, on June 12, 2009, the Security Council unanimously passed resolution 1874, which imposed additional sanctions designed to prevent or interdict nuclear, missile, and proliferation transactions involving the DPRK. Two weeks later, Pyongyang fired different versions of short-range missiles (including seven tests on July 4, 2009), though it has yet to carry out its threat to launch longer-range missiles. The North also renewed its pledges to augment its stockpile of plutonium and to pursue a dedicated enrichment program.

Since first testing a nuclear device in October 2006, the DPRK had assumed an ambiguous strategic position, claiming the right to retain its nuclear capacities while asserting that it was still prepared to forego them. But this ambiguity had dissipated in private and public comments in the latter half of 2008 and early 2009, presaging the escalatory actions of subsequent months. Pyongyang’s decision to walk away from the Six-Party process and resume its weapons development also suggests that the North’s interest in a binding, negotiated denuclearization agreement had been tenuous at best.

What explains North Korea’s recent actions? Is there any realistic prospect for renewed negotiations? What policy options exist in light of North Korea’s claims to nuclear weapons status?

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