No Way to Treat Our Friends: Recasting Recent U.S.-Georgian Relations

Provocations - Alexander Cooley and Lincoln A. Mitchell

No Way to Treat Our Friends: Recasting Recent U.S.-Georgian Relations

Alexander Cooley is Associate Professor of Political Science at Barnard College, Columbia University, a member of Columbia’s Harriman Institute Study Group on U.S.-Russia and Georgia Relations, and the author of Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas (Cornell University Press, 2008). He may be reached at ac210@columbia.edu.
Lincoln A. Mitchell is the Arnold A. Saltzman Assistant Professor in the Practice of International Politics at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, co-director of Columbia’s Harriman Institute Study Group on U.S-Russia and Georgia Relations, and the author of Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia’s Rose Revolution (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). He may be reached at lam13@columbia.edu

The tragic August conflict between Georgia and Russia has initiated a wave of accusations about which side was to blame for the outbreak of full-scale war. The war and its aftermath have ratcheted tensions between the West and Russia, as the international community pressures Moscow to withdraw its troops from Georgian territory and abide by its ceasefire obligations. Russian president Dmitry Medvedev’s reckless decision to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia not only contravenes international law regarding sovereign statehood, but if allowed to stand, would establish the unacceptable precedent that countries can justify military intervention in the territory of a neighbor by invoking the rights of their ethnic citizens. Not surprisingly, Russia has found little support in the international community for its heavy-handed actions, even among friendly countries.

Yet, as analysts focus on the Russian-Georgian relationship, the questions of how the United States–Georgia’s friend and patron–failed to anticipate the conflict and prevent its escalation need to be addressed. Two unequivocal, but ultimately flawed, principles guided recent U.S. policy towards Georgia. First, the United States supported the Saakashvili government, rather than promoting broader Georgian democratic development. Second, the United States backed reuniting Georgia’s territorial integrity, rather than acting as an honest broker to resolve the frozen conflicts with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The strong personalized ties that developed between Washington and Tbilisi prevented the United States from using its power and influence to credibly restrain the Saakashvili government from adopting a military solution. U.S. reluctance to encourage Georgia to consider alternative sovereign formulas to resolve the frozen conflicts further emboldened Georgian hardliners. Over time, the Georgian regime’s domestic policies and priorities themselves became official U.S. policies and goals, leading to an unhealthy capture of U.S. foreign policy by Tbilisi.

Looking forward, the United States must continue to offer robust and sustained support to Georgia and its democratic development, but should do so by reversing these demonstrably flawed principles. What policies should the new U.S. administration adopt that would preserve its friendly relations with Georgia, while pushing Georgia toward a territorial compromise that it does not yet favor?

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