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In this issue . . .

PROVOCATIONS
Unholy Symbiosis: Isolationism and AntiAmericanism Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

MIDDLE EAST LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION
Prospects for Moving Forward, His Majesty King Abdullah II

JAPAN AFTER THE 'LOST DECADE'
Asia's First Globalizer, Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

BALKANS: FIVE YEARS AFTER DAYTON
The United States in the Balkans: There to Stay, Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon

CHARLES COOK ON WASHINGTON
Polls and Models: Which Numbers to Believe?

PICTURES WORTH 1,000 WORDS

 


   

Autumn 2000 Vol. 23, No. 3

 

 

Middle East Leadership Succession - Jon B. Alterman

   

Egypt: Stable, but for How Long?

Jon B. Alterman covers the Middle East in the Research and Studies Program at the United States Institute of Peace. He lived in Egypt for extended periods between 1991 and 1995. The views expressed here are his own.

The regime of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak seems to have escaped from the challenges of the 1990s with a steadier political configuration. Mubarak appears poised to rule for at least another decade; even if he were to leave office during that time, political succession would almost certainly be smooth and orderly and would preserve the status quo. The trade off for stability, however, has been that the regime now relies on a narrower base of support than was the case just ten years ago. For the first time since the 1952 revolution, the Egyptian government has abandoned any pretense of populism; it has opted for elite support and backroom deals rather than broad public support or a vibrant political life. In the longer term, the challenge for the system as it was reconstituted in the 1990s will be whether it has the durability to survive an economic downturn, social unrest, or both.

Barely a decade ago, the Egyptian government appeared to be tottering. As economic growth turned negative in the late 1980s, Egypt's debt to gross national product (GNP) ratio was among the highest in the world, wages were plummeting, and unemployment was skyrocketing. On top of the economic
morass, militants using the slogans and symbols of Islam were waging war on the government, which was responding with repression. Forty years after the Free Officers' Movement deposed King Faruq, there was a widespread feeling that political and economic life in Egypt had again become sclerotic and corrupt and that the system needed a jolt. Many Egyp tians perceived their government to be venal, inept, and inefficient. Islamin spired organizations, on the other hand, had a proven track record of providing services more efficiently than the government. They seemed honest,
and they had a clear message. Furthermore, the militants were the only force in society willing to express their opposition to the status quo, and by virtue of that fact alone they garnered public support.

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