

Europe 2007: From Nation-States to Member States

Think back. The time is June 1957. A few European heads of state and government are meeting in Rome to launch a small common market as a down payment for an “ever closer” community that many of them question and none truly understand. What has brought them together is the evidence of their predecessors’ failures, none as tragic as the two world wars they have just waged and from which they have been partially rescued by their new senior partner across the Atlantic. The peace they now hope to achieve will be sought a piece at a time. Their goal is not to dissolve the nation-states they represent but to save them from themselves as well as from each other.

Think ahead. Fifty years have passed, and the time is June 2007. The small community of six has grown into a larger union of many. Along the way, its agenda became ever more complex: deepen in order to widen, but also widen in order to deepen, and reform in order to do both. More than once, the process seemed hopelessly stalled. Yet, the fiction imagined earlier as “Europe” has turned into a reality: with an identity distinguishable from that of the nation-states that constitute it, with regional institutions distinct from the national institutions that gave them birth, and with a collective discipline often enforced in opposition to its members’ preferences. Now, in 2007, the nation-states of Europe have been recycled into member states. Their former condition is a memory and a conviction more than a fact—the lingering memory of the national sovereignty they used to enjoy within their own boundaries and the illusory conviction that it has not been overtaken within the new common space they have agreed to make their own.

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The Washington Quarterly • 23:4 pp. 15–29.

By the very nature of history, moments with a predictable impact on the future cannot be identified until the moment is gone. The future must become past before it can be told. By its very nature too, a defining moment remains open-ended even after it has been uncovered. Hindsight determines when it began and even how it closed. Yet, because so much has already happened since 1957, much of what will be celebrated in 2007 can already be anticipated. It is as if history, at last, could be denied its imagination as it brings Europe into an endgame whose outcome can be ascertained before its time has been lived:

- reform of EU governance negotiated through three Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs)—in July 1997 in Amsterdam, in December 2000 in Nice, and, most likely, in 2004;
- a completed euro-zone, started in 11 countries in 1999, perfected at 12 or more in 2002, and completed at 15 by 2005, with all EU members and many other non-EU states wanting easy access to the fully operational single market that began in 1992;
- confirmation of the EU commitment to enlargement to the East, beginning in 2005, but also possible accession talks with such recalcitrant states as Norway and even Switzerland;
- fulfillment, in 2003–2007, of the post-Kosovo “headline goals” as a down payment for a European Security Policy that would set the stage, at last, for a Common Foreign Policy and, ultimately, a Common Defense Policy; and
- by 2007, too, new forms of U.S.-EU and EU-NATO relations, including new accords between the United States and the EU, as well as a reformed Atlantic Council that coordinates the complementary roles played by the two institutions.

In 2000, no country in Europe, and few of its political leaders, would dare acknowledge the scope and even urgency of the decisions they contemplate and the transformation they face. Historians will marvel. This, they will write, was a time neither for grand designs conceived from the top down, as after World War II, nor for revolutions enacted from the bottom up, as after World War I. This, historians will explain, was a time when the leaders’ will to be, as opposed to their predecessors’ will to do, was matched by their followers’ urge to join and enjoy the system rather than to leave or destroy it. Yet, historians will conclude, so it had been for the process of European integration during and after the Cold War, when every step in a specific area caused unexpected progress in another area—from a supranational coal and steel community to a common defense, from the aborted common army to a modest common mar-

ket, from an expanding common market to a challenging monetary system to a single market to a single currency and back to a common defense.

Completing Europe

No defining moment can escape the unpredictable event, the unexpected decision, or even the unforeseeable act of God that shaped all subsequent developments. Who could have expected, at the start of each of the past decades, the enormity of what followed—the military conflicts, the economic crises, the political upheavals, the technological revolutions, and much more? Still, several interrelated variables are most likely to shape Europe in the coming years:

- the economic cycle and the pace of growth;
- the quality of political leadership and public support;
- the relative effectiveness of Europe's institutions in addressing their members' common agendas for stability within Europe and on its periphery; and
- the steadfastness of America's engagement in, and commitment to, Europe.

Economic growth is essential. The economic cycle is the starting point to think about Europe's future. A severe economic crisis in 2001–2002 could cause serious political instabilities and sharp societal disruptions that would delay or even reverse earlier decisions by and about the EU. Conversely, a sustained period of growth would help: the construction of Europe is especially effective when it can rely on affluence to produce even more affluence. The 2.5 percent annual rate of economic growth projected by the European Commission's Agenda 2000 for the six-year period until 2006 is a minimum requirement; more, as anticipated for 2000–2002, would be better, but less could be harmful, especially in Germany and Italy. More growth will help each state respond to its citizens' needs—including, for example, education for the young, jobs for the adults, and pensions for the old. But growth will also help the EU institutions fulfill its members' commitments, as it would create additional funds for the provision of subsidies to struggling sectors or underdeveloped regions, as well as for enlargement.

Although there is every reason to be bullish on Europe for the coming years, downside risks abound. Whether the recession in Japan will bottom out beyond 2000 will affect this country's neighbors in Asia, but it will also have consequences on the United States and Europe, including Germany and France, which have invested heavily in China and Japan, respectively. Further risks can be found in the emerging markets in Latin America (with immediate

consequences for Spain), as well as out of an economic collapse in Russia. Most significant, a hard fall of exceedingly high levels of U.S. equity and share prices in 2000–2002 would affect consumer spending and business investment in the United States and feed through the European economies.

Finally, up to the elimination of national currencies in 2002 and beyond, as the euro goes, so will Europe. Started in the early 1990s against a background of weakening growth, high unemployment, and much public skepticism,

the euro emerged, late in the decade, as Europe's most ambitious project for the new century. Its achievements immediately prior to and after January 1999 should not be minimized. The euro was an unprecedented act of collective will: the heads of state and government gambled on Europe's future, and they won, despite odds that seemed insurmountable, especially in the southern countries. Inflation was conquered, budget deficits

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reduced, and long-term interest rate differentials narrowed. The euro also transformed policymaking in Europe by reducing the range of national sovereignty, diluting the authority of the European Commission, and even challenging the prerogatives of the European Council and the sacrosanct right of representation for all member states in the European Central Bank (ECB). It stood as a rampart against monetary instabilities in Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, against military conflicts in Southeastern Europe, and even against political turbulence in key European countries and within the EU. In 1999–2000, its weakness relative to the U.S. dollar was temporary and helped explore the fluctuating bands between the two currencies, below and above parity.

To be sure much remains to be done. Although Europe's fiscal and monetary policies changed dramatically in anticipation of the euro, these policies will need to be maintained at least until 2002—which would prove politically difficult without a robust economic cycle. National currencies must be formally withdrawn. The euro zone must be extended to all EU states, including the United Kingdom. An effective common economic policy must be devised and enforced. The ECB's full independence of national governments and related pressures must be asserted. Reliable exchange rate arrangements with other global currencies, including the dollar, must be developed, and relations with other centers of monetary authority, including the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, must be coordinated. The role of the euro as a global currency must be clarified. As these goals are achieved, new questions about Europe's ability to move on with the euro will emerge.

Yet, these are not merely questions about Europe's ability to have a single currency; these are questions about Europe's ability to have a future, as well as America's interest in a flourishing future for Europe. The EU states and their governments have invested too much in the euro to let it go, and the United States has invested too much in Europe to let it falter.

Political centrism is necessary. In coming years, long-term institutional goals of the EU will test the ability of its members' weak centrist coalition majorities to postpone the instant gratification sought by their respective constituencies. For example, the budgetary discipline imposed through the Commission or the ECB may become politically too costly if unemployment remains too high. Moreover, EU governments can call on the same logic of austerity imposed upon them by the EU to demand from the EU a budgetary discipline that the Commission could no longer withstand. For example, after 2006 the ceiling placed on its budget (1.27 percent of its members' gross domestic product) may have to be revised upward to meet the costs of enlargement. Other perennial issues that will demand action even before enlargement include reforming further the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), abandoning protected national champions to the forces of the free market, and even including in the EU budget an appropriate level of defense spending to permit progress in the security area.

On the way to 2007, such questions—who pays, who gains—could spur a public debate that would erode the political orthodoxy that progressively reconciled Left and Right into a centrist Third Way throughout the EU. “Europe” is an idea that citizens agree to embrace, but it is not yet an ideal for which they are prepared to suffer and, therefore, not a reality on which member governments may be ready to stand for a long time against the will of their constituencies. For much of the 1990s, it is Europe's agenda, defined from the top down, that drove the political calendar of the EU states. In coming years, however, the risk will be that doing more for Europe might be viewed as higher than the risk of doing less. “I was turned out,” complained Margaret Thatcher in June 1995, “because I said ‘No’ to Europe, ‘No, no, no.’” For Tony Blair and others, political risks may ultimately emerge out of an exaggerated “‘Yes’ to Europe, ‘Yes, yes, yes.’”

Twice in 1999, national governments acted on extraordinarily sensitive issues without credible support from their national constituencies but with a legitimacy borrowed from the institutional label placed on their actions. So it was with the euro, and so it was, too, with the war in Kosovo. In both cases, the centrist consensus held because the policies worked. Risks were high, however. In France, Italy, and Spain, the governing majority would not have survived a failure to meet the Maastricht criteria of economic convergence for inclusion in the core group of states that launched the euro in

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January 1999. In Italy, Germany, and Greece, the government might not have survived a NATO decision to escalate the air war into a potentially nightmarish land war. Conversely, however, the policies worked because they received the broad centrist stamp of nearly nonpartisan approval often led by center-left heads of government that dared challenge large parts of their constituencies. In the end, the quality of Europe's leadership will determine how well and how quickly the EU can proceed with the difficult agenda set for the years ahead. That such high expectations would be placed on a post-Cold War generation that has often appeared to lack the visionary drive of the post-World War II generation add much irony to the urgency of the moment.

Institutional effectiveness is imperative. The salvation rather than the erosion of the nation-state was the goal of European integration. Indeed, the states of Europe repeatedly sought to reassert their authority and influence over the institution to which they gave birth. Thus, much of what the EU becomes by the year 2007 will depend on its capacity to address effectively the common concerns and priorities that its members are not able or willing to do separately. Current trends in jobs and job creation, income distribution, shrinking populations, depleted pension funds, immigration flows, and education, for example, may not be manageable by any single member. These trends are not, and do not have to be, the same for all members. Nor are they, nor do they need to be, evenly shared. But these trends and the questions they raise are sufficiently common to EU states to suggest needs and priorities that the EU must address on behalf of all its members:

- Inequalities within the EU and EU states, and between EU members and nonmembers, cannot be allowed to persist, let alone widen. Otherwise, there might come a point when the societal and political consequences of these inequalities could no longer be borne by the EU states relative to each other and by the rest of Europe relative to the EU. Especially as enlargement to the east gets under way, the EU will have to engage its neighbors creatively and generously.
- The EU must help its members reconcile those aspects of their economy that are world class and those that drag them toward the bottom of the new global economy. For example, Europe must be ready to service the 60 million people who are expected to have or seek Internet access by the end of 2002, with an electronic commerce estimated at \$223 billion.

- European firms must be able to compete globally for new markets, and the EU must help ease the privatization that is necessary before further consolidation within Europe and even across the Atlantic. Yet, such needs should remain sensitive to the uniqueness of an economic space that became common before its political integration could be effectively completed.
- Shrinking and aging populations everywhere in the EU area may erode the domestic cohesion of each EU state and distort the solidarity of the Union. The EU will have to find ways to ensure social peace by assuming the state's traditional role in such areas as the provision of welfare and health care and the management of pensions.
- As boundaries are blurred, the EU should also assume greater responsibilities in balancing Europe's structural dependence on many more immigrants (with Europe's need estimated at 135 million by 2025) and the Europeans' desire to close the borders on any new foreign arrivals.

How well the EU addresses or anticipates the needs of its members will shape the public reaction to EU initiatives. In other words, ask not what the nation-states of Europe can do (and actually do) for the EU, but what the EU does (and can do) for its member states. After World War II, the idea of Europe relied on a public mood that was generally permissive because it seemed to grant political redemption for the state, economic affluence for its citizens, and security for the nation. After the Cold War, however, the idea of Europe must rely on governments that give the EU credit for what it does rather than blame it for what they cannot do.

Security is fundamental. Western Europe entered the new century safer than at any time in the twentieth century and, arguably, any time in its history. The European space is irreversibly civil, meaning that war among the EU states is no longer thinkable. Yet, first Bosnia, and then Kosovo, served as reminders that there is also much unfinished security business in twenty-first century Europe, including not only unresolved ethnic and territorial conflicts that predate the Cold War, but also Russia and a new security agenda of risks imported from adjacent areas outside the European continent.

With regard to Russia, other bursts of military brutality at home, *à la* Chechnya, or outbursts of geopolitical revisionism in the former Soviet space, are matters of primary concern. Developments in the direction of democracy, a market economy, and a community of interests with the West are also important. Yet, Russia is too big, too strong, and too nuclear to be managed by the Europeans alone, but it is also too close, too engaged, and too European to be left to Americans alone. There, as in so many other areas, the states of Europe and the United States, as well as the EU and NATO, play roles that must be made, and will have to remain, both compatible and

complementary. At least in the period ahead, the United States will continue to provide the security guarantee of choice through NATO as the primary security institution. The main EU role in Russia will be to contribute to its assimilation into the open, affluent, and democratic space to which Brussels holds the key. For both the EU and NATO, engaging Russia stops far short of a membership that will remain highly unlikely (and even not desirable) for at least one full decade beyond 2007—coinciding, as it so happens, with the 100th anniversary of the Soviet revolution.

Conditions are more complicated (but not more dangerous) on Europe's periphery, along a wide arc of Islamic states extending from the Maghreb region through the Middle East into the Persian Gulf and to Turkey and its neighbors in Central Asia. These complications do not result from contradictory goals, competitive interests, or adversarial policies among EU countries, as well as between them and the United States within NATO. On the whole, the EU countries maintain comparable goals and compatible interests in the region: deterring the spread of terrorism and containing the rise of radical Islamic governments; avoiding the interruption of oil supplies and the manipulation of oil prices; sustaining the peace process between Israel and the Arab states; preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and often, but not always, protecting and enhancing human rights. Even when these goals and interests are not shared evenly, differences among EU states are usually lesser than differences with the United States, especially when they entail the use of military force (mostly, U.S. military force).

Beyond the traditional security agenda, new security risks could disrupt trends in some EU states and, by implication, their position within the EU. Bursts of transnational terrorism, locally grown or imported from non-EU states south of the Mediterranean, could unsettle current centrist conditions in the EU. Elsewhere, renewed conflict in the Balkans or civil wars in North Africa could raise pressures for unilateral interventions that would not seek "legitimization" from the EU, with or despite other NATO countries. After centuries of wars, however, Europe has lost its taste for military conflicts and violence, including politically motivated terrorist acts. Many such crises, therefore, could invite appeasement from EU states, causing discord within the EU and with the United States. That these tensions could erupt in the context of ongoing institutional debates over enlargement to the East is an additional complicating factor.

U.S. engagement is indispensable. After World War II, Europe's fate depended on the two superpowers. Both the United States and Russia took a time-out from their own history to reinvent Europe—one power obviously more creatively and effectively than the other. Besides what the superpowers

did or failed to do, the fate of the nation-states of Europe also rested on their ability to overcome their divisions. They, too, needed to take a time-out from their own history if they were to be saved from each other, as well as from themselves. The idea of Europe was hardly born then. But however ancient the idea, it gained life only after the need for unity could no longer be ignored, even as the urge for revenge lingered for many more years.

Now, despite fading Cold War memories, every EU decision has a U.S. dimension, and every U.S. decision can have an EU dimension. That such would be the case is one of the most enduring legacies of the Cold War, not because it means the resurrection of the United States as a European power but because it confirms its status as a power in Europe. Arguably the only Great Power left on the continent, the United States is a nonmember member state of the EU. Thus, the indispensability of U.S. engagement is hardly a matter of false sentimentality. Rather, it is a question of genuine interests that are not matched, *in toto*, in any other region of the world outside the Western Hemisphere. In 1999, the war in Kosovo confirmed what had already been demonstrated during the war in Bosnia and the negotiations in Dayton in late 1995, namely, the centrality of U.S. leadership and power in a continent where U.S. interests have become too significant to be left to Europeans. This need not be a matter for domestic debate, as shown by the ease with which Congress and the U.S. public endorsed the decisions to enlarge NATO, deploy peacekeeping forces in Bosnia indefinitely, and wage war in Kosovo and participate in its postwar reconstruction. That it would seem to be a matter for debate in Europe betrays a troubling European ambivalence about the United States that will have to be addressed and resolved during the coming years.

The U.S. commitment to a strong and united Europe, however, is not unconditional. The commitment to a united Europe presupposes a transatlantic community built on compatible social values, democratic practice, liberal economic structures, and free-trade policies. The commitment to a strong Europe also anticipates allies that would readily assume a larger share of the common defense burden in and beyond the NATO area. Although common sense would suggest that 50 years of transatlantic solidarity and more than 40 years of European unity have taught both sides of the Atlantic that there are no alternatives to staying the course, some ambivalence continues to blur each side's vision of the other. European allies that follow the U.S. leadership selectively and on the cheap, a fragmented U.S. Congress that emphasizes domestic issues and does not fear divorce with Europe, and a public

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that does not care much about interests that are not explained well are possible catalysts for transatlantic fragmentation. Such potential for drift would be especially serious if Europe's new strength on its way to 2007 were to cause an assertiveness that would induce the EU and its members to challenge rather than share the global leadership of their senior partner. A significant item on the transatlantic agenda is the development of a restructured relationship between the EU and the United States that would reflect the U.S. recognition of Europe as a copartner and Europe's acknowledgment of a privileged status for the United States within the EU.

Farewell to History

Admittedly, it is possible to imagine circumstances that would stall Europe and its relations with the United States to the point of derailment by the year 2007. Both the European and the transatlantic agendas are ambitious, and their overlapping calendars raise serious risks of overload. Reforming the EU institutions in 2000 and beyond, managing the transition to economic and monetary union in 2002 and beyond, launching a European Security Policy in 2003 and beyond, completing the EU reforms in 2004 and beyond, and enlarging to the East in 2005 and beyond will not be easy. That such a European agenda will have to be addressed from the top down without causing or exacerbating public disappointment, and even anger, from the bottom up adds to the complexity of the coming years. Simultaneously, the road to new U.S.-EU and EU-NATO relations is fraught with many obstacles. Early skirmishes prior to a millennium round of trade negotiations in 2000 and beyond, debating the future of nuclear weapons in 2001 and beyond, defining euro-dollar relations in 2002 and beyond, and ensuring the integration of the "headline goals" and the NATO mandate in 2003 and beyond are all serious matters.

A reversal of Europe's postwar quest for an "ever closer union" could unfold as follows: After 2000, the risks of renewed conflict in the Balkans (starting, say, in Montenegro) and worsening conditions within Russia and in Ukraine would make some key EU members (especially the UK) more fearful of European defense initiatives that might weaken NATO without providing for alternative protection. Simultaneously, new instabilities at the periphery of Europe could also leave the main EU states too distrustful of their respective national goals to permit progress in the area of a common foreign policy. Renewed violence over the unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state, conflicts of political succession in key Arab states (especially Egypt, but also Saudi Arabia and Syria), a drift toward civil war in Iran, renewed conflicts with or within Iraq, instabilities in the Caspian region, and

even some antiseccular turbulence in Turkey are only a few of the issues that could escalate quickly into a significant crisis for both Europe and the United States, but also for U.S.-European relations. Because of Europe's rising dependence on oil imports, renewed volatility in the greater Middle East would be especially critical for the EU economies under pre-crisis conditions of high oil prices. Farther away, Europe's indifference to other crises involving significant U.S. interests—for example, a war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir or a crisis with a desperate North Korean regime, both with sharp nuclear overtones—would cause even more exasperation in the United States and desperation in Europe.

In 2001–2002, too, a hard landing in Wall Street could ignite the kind of deep economic crisis (recession and inflation) that disrupted transatlantic and intra-European relations in the 1970s. The euro's failure to shield the EU states from the U.S. economy and to deliver its goals of rapid growth and full employment would make it easier for non-euro states (including the UK) to stay away. A sense of euro-failure would also encourage public debate for withdrawal or, at least, a postponement of the final launch of the single currency past 2002, especially in the context of national elections in Italy and the UK (in 2001) and in France and Germany (in 2002). With most EU members prepared to take a time-out from the aging Maastricht agenda, ratification of the IGC reforms negotiated in 2000 would be stalled in 2001, causing crippling bilateral tensions within the EU, especially between France and Germany. With geopolitical turmoil at the EU periphery, monetary turbulence within the EU area, and open disagreement between the two key EU states over institutional reform, a postponement of EU enlargement, too, would seem inevitable—thus extending the political crisis to applicant countries in the East. In such a context, the widespread growth of public opposition to Europe would bring the EU to the forefront of the political debates for the next cycle of national elections in 2005–2007, when populist alliances would aim their dissent at “Europe” and the pain imposed in its name.

Haunted by the reported sights of Europe's historic ghosts, a new U.S. administration, halfway through the one- or two-term mandate started in January 2001, might reappraise its commitments to both Europe and its Union. Emphasis would be placed on the unilateral protection of U.S. interests at a lesser cost—meaning less NATO (and certainly no further enlargement) and less EU (and certainly fewer trade concessions), but also less America in Europe (including Kosovo and Russia) and even elsewhere. De-

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prepared to suffer.**

nied the United States' leadership, NATO would fade, causing new instabilities in Europe, across the Mediterranean, and beyond. Questions about NATO would come together with more questions about the EU, prompting the United States to return to special bilateral relationships for a more effective management of its interests in Europe.

None of these developments, and more, can be excluded. They might not force a collapse of the EU, but they could cripple its institutions to the point of confining the European construction to an unfinished and unsatisfying single market—open in some areas and protected in others. Even a modern

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member state of
the EU.**

Cassandra, however, would view these developments as eminently doubtful. They certainly would mark a brutal departure from the trends observed over the past 40 years. What is doubtful, too, is that such developments would be left to themselves and escalate and spread as readily as they might have during the Cold War, after World War II, or between the two world wars. In Europe, as well as between Europe and the United States, there is now a self-

control that is an especially enduring legacy of the twentieth century. The total war that erupted in 1914 (and again in 1939), the mythical disengagement from Europe that became the U.S. option of choice in 1919 (and was briefly considered in 1945), the economic depression and tariff wars that erupted after 1929, the totalitarian insanity that spread in and beyond Europe after 1933, and the ideological bid for hegemony that was initiated in 1945 are no longer likely. Even the collapse of European integration or a U.S. disengagement from Europe escape definition. In the end, imagining Europe in 2007 without the EU, or the United States without Europe, is a challenge.

Thus, the second half of the twentieth century has left Europe with few alternative futures. By 2007, Europe will not be finished, but it will have continued to move closer, and even close, to completion. On that part of the continent where the EU will have gained a reality nearly tantamount to that of a state, the emotional burdens of history have been put to rest. This is as much of an end game as history can play. Although June 2007 may come too quickly for the EU agenda to be completed, specific dates matter less than the general trends that underline them. Admittedly, the process of turning the nation-states of Europe into the member states of the EU will remain erratic, with moments of national despondency and institutional stagnation. In the end, however, what matters most about the construction of Europe is the *relance* that follows delays and setbacks. For the past 40

years, no member ever pulled out, and the time is gone when any could, as France and the United Kingdom occasionally assumed to be the case. During the coming years, the very few countries that declined an invitation to join (like Norway) or refused to seek it (like Switzerland) are likely to re-view their decision, even as many other applicants await their entry or the opening of access negotiations.

Assuming a robust economic cycle, effective national and EU political leadership, relative stability in Eastern Europe and at the southern periphery, and continued cooperation with the United States, the EU will display, by the year 2007, many characteristics often gained at the expense of its members:

- a more muscular Commission, with reduced influence of the smaller members relative to their larger partners, but also of the latter relative to the Commission president; and a more assertive Parliament, relative to the Commission but also in relation to national legislatures;
- a changed weighting of votes in the Council of Ministers devised to extend qualified majority voting while protecting the more populous members against blocking minorities in a wider EU;
- a deeper range of policy responsibilities that would give the EU further authority for priorities (from job and industrial policy to food safety and visa policy) that individual members cannot address on their own for lack of political will or economic resources;
- a fully operational single market with a completed euro-zone grouping most if not all current EU members as well as various non-EU and even non-European members that might enter the zone for reasons of their own;
- new steps, beginning with the 2003 Headline Goals, toward a European Security Policy, a Common Foreign Policy, and, ultimately, a European Security and Defense Policy that would give Europe more autonomy of action within the context of an enlarged NATO; and
- between 20 and 25 members, including at least half of the current applicants from the East, plus, possibly, smaller states like Cyprus and Malta and even, arguably, Norway and Switzerland.

What about the other Europe, however, where the virtues of integration have not been recognized yet? There, possible futures do abound, and which future comes to pass may affect the pace of what comes to be elsewhere. Late in the 1990s, the ghosts sighted in the Balkans were those of an earlier time when nations were looking for a state and states were looking for their borders. This old-fashioned anarchy still prevails in some parts of Europe,

but resulting conflicts, as in Bosnia and Kosovo, have seemed both out of place and out of time—there, in Europe, and now, at the close of the twentieth century. Unlike previous European wars that often started in the Balkans, these conflicts could, therefore, end with relative ease. In short, historic legacies in Southeastern Europe cannot be neglected, but their earlier defining characteristics—namely, a potential for the spontaneous escalation of a local limited conflict into a general and total war—no longer apply.

If not in the Balkans, might these legacies of strife and violence be more significant farther in the East, especially Russia? There, the case for a return of history is more worrisome. Entering the twenty-first century, the problem of Russia is Europe's problem—the hole in the doughnut of the increasingly thicker dough that shapes Europe's integration. What will be of Russia—moderate and well integrated, alienated and combative, broken and collapsed, or in a worse combination, well integrated and combative, or collapsed and alienated? No one knows, and no one can even imagine it yet. For Russia, 2007 is just one date in the near future. It will take many more years, indeed several decades, for this country to come to terms with its place in Europe, whatever that place may be, and its role in the world, whatever that role may become. In the meantime, neglecting its needs, offending its pride, ignoring its interests, or challenging its power can only be done at everyone's peril, in Europe and across the Atlantic.

Staying on Course

There is a need for thought and prudence, then, but no great need for imagination. A more united Europe is good for the states of Europe and it is good for the United States too: whether now or by 2007, there is no better plausible alternative. Any other conclusion would fundamentally challenge what has been the most consistent goal of U.S. policies toward Europe during the past 50 years, as well as Europe's most consistent objective for more than 40 years.

As the debate over the boundaries of permissible differences between the ascending influence of Europe and the peerless power of the United States unfolds, the most compelling vision statement is to complete the vision that guided both sides of the Atlantic after World War II and throughout the Cold War. Since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949, and the Rome Treaties in 1957, U.S. policies in Europe and the integration of Europe have served U.S. and European interests well. More Europe, but also more America in Europe will continue to serve these interests well too. The central lesson of the twentieth century is that America's problems in Europe result from Europe's failures: a war that cannot be ended, a revolution that

cannot be controlled, or, closer to us, a currency that would not be stabilized and sustained.

Entering a new century, America's main fear about Europe should be a Europe that is weak and divided, and our main hope should be a Europe that becomes stronger and more united. After the old Europe had caused far too much pain for too long, the birth of a new Europe has been relatively quick and extraordinarily civil. Midway through the century, a "good" European like Stefan Zweig agonized over the many futures he had been forced to outlive: the Europe of the *fin du siècle*, extraordinarily vibrant and prosperous, but also prepared to spread its dynamism and prosperity to others on the continent and beyond; postwar Europe, willing to bear the burdens of the slaughters for which it had been responsible during the previous few years; and interwar Europe, overwhelmed by the tyrants, torn by its passions, betrayed by its intellectuals, ready to fall once again in the abyss that it had dug for itself. "How many lives must I live," moaned Zweig after an existence that he found too hopeless to endure. The past 50 years have also had their share of killing, but now at least Zweig would no longer feel hopeless. At last, Europe's long and brutal struggle with its history may be ending.