Elizabeth Pond

Kosovo: Catalyst for Europe

For Europeans, the war in Kosovo was existential. It put to the test all the continent's gains of the previous fifty years, and especially of the post–Cold War 1990s. It challenged the assumption that at last, at the end of a terrible century, voluntary cooperation had triumphed over Nazi and Communist coercion. It exhumed the savage ethnic Balkan wars of bygone eras, even those before the forgotten Great War.

The earlier failure of Europe (as of America) to stop atrocities in Bosnia at the beginning of the 1990s had been different. That lapse was attributed to surprise, to residual reluctance to upset the nuclear Cold War balance, to the murk in measuring the relative cruelty of reciprocal murders by Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks. "Bosnia came too early" was the common excuse. The European Community had not yet bestirred itself after two decades of Eurosclerosis to achieve the single European market targeted for the beginning of 1993 or the Maastricht design of monetary union. The Russian legions that would remain in Central Europe and Germany until 1994 made governments reluctant to test Russian sensitivities in foreign policy. The French and British were still queasy about German unification and still flirting with the idea of a return to nineteenth-century, balance-of-power politics in backing the Serbs against the "German" Croats. Passive Europeans were still too accustomed to letting the U.S. superpower make security decisions for its transatlantic proteges.

Besides, ten years ago the Balkans were just not part of the mental map of Europe. In Bismarck's lingering words, they were not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier. The whole aim of diplomacy in Bosnia was

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simply to wall off barbaric Yugoslavia and prevent its conflagration from jumping over to civilized Europe.

By 1999, however, the old alibis no longer applied. Europe did not need to fear any backlash from a Russia whose GDP had shrunk to less than the capitalization of Wal-Mart, whose armies had retreated a thousand miles to the east and degenerated after the disastrous slaughter in Chechnya. The European Union (EU), as it became in 1993, came to realize that it was in fact more than just an emergency Cold War artifact, and even to anticipate a brave "common foreign and security policy" in the Amsterdam Treaty as well as in the Maastricht Treaty. Virtually all of the post-Communist governments of the small nationalities perennially suspended between the powerful Russians and Germans were now drawn irresistibly to the magnets of the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), eschewing Russian dysfunction and aspiring instead to a German-style transformation from a hierarchical to a democratic mindset.

Most important, perhaps, the West could no longer plead ignorance. It had seen the fruit of its earlier malign neglect in the Serb massacre of Bosniaks at Srebrenica. This had answered definitively the question of comparative evil and identified the Serbs as the most bloodthirsty offenders in ex-Yugoslavia. It had also altered the pacifist reflexes of the '68 generation of European protesters against the Vietnam War, who now ruled most of the continent. Joschka Fischer, foreign minister in Germany's new Social Democratic-Green government, was the most eloquent among his fellows in Europe's new-wave left cabinets in expressing agony over the growing conflict between his two basic principles of "no more war" and "no more genocide." For him and his colleagues in crisis, the latter precept had to prevail, even at the cost of NATO's first hot war. In Europe, in this day and age, they could not acquiesce in Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic's brutality. They could not be like all those good Germans who had looked the other way—and failed to prevent worse—as their Jewish neighbors were persecuted in Kristallnacht in 1938.

Moreover, subconsciously, a generation that had grown up thinking on a European scale now put Bismarck behind them and took it for granted that even the recalcitrant Balkans must be part of their new Europe.[1] The contest, said Javier Solana, secretary-general of NATO and future foreign-policy spokesman for the EU, was "between two visions of Europe. One vision—Milosevic's vision—is of a Europe of ethnically pure states, a Europe of nationalism, authoritarianism, and xenophobia. The other vision—that of the NATO Allies, the European Union, and of our Partners—is a Europe of integration, democracy, and ethnic pluralism."[2]

The war in Kosovo was a just war, added British prime minister Tony Blair, a moral crusade that was all the more legitimate because there was no

conceivable material or exclusive cultural interest involved. There was no oil to be had. The Connecticut-size region was a backwater rather than any strategic crossroads. The people whose human rights NATO was defending, unlike all the Catholics and Protestants in the EU, were not Christians, but Muslims. What was at stake was no more—but also no less—than the identity of twenty-first-century Europe. Now the Albanians too were brothers, and the Europeans were obliged to be their brothers' keeper. Notably, there was strong public support for this stance except in Greece.[3]

For the United States, by contrast, the war in Kosovo represented only a derivative interest. To be sure, especially after the air strikes began, Washington had its own strong incentives: to avoid humiliation as the West's guarantor of last resort and prevent the disintegration of NATO's core of future coalitions of the willing. And tactically, the United States was the main initiator and actor and the undisputed commander-in-chief. Yet its stake remained derivative. Because stability and decency in Kosovo were important to Europe, they were also important to Washington. But they did not have the inherent urgency of, say, preventing Iraq from developing a nuclear bomb. Indeed, as NATO verged on losing the war of nerves and strategy in Kosovo throughout the month of May, policymakers worried that Americans might begin to question why they were providing three-quarters of the planes for this operation when it really was, or should have been, Europe's responsibility.

What was at stake was no more than the identity of twenty-first century Europe.

In the end, the West escaped the many black scenarios. No single U.S. body bag came back from combat to haunt President Bill Clinton. He did not have to make any fateful decision to commit ground troops or else abandon the fight. Russia was not irreconcilably alienated from the West and proved amenable, if grumpily, to becoming part of the solution rather than part of the problem. The more than one million Kosovo Albanian refugees did not destabilize Albania and Macedonia, did not have to live in tent cities over winter, did not become a permanent diaspora or lose their will to return home and take charge of their own lives. It was Milosevic's determination that buckled, even though the Yugoslav army still felt unvanquished. NATO's extraordinary solidarity held up over eleven long weeks of bombing, despite an errant strike on the Chinese embassy, heart-rending television images of Serb as well as Albanian casualties, and overwhelming Greek public opposition to the air strikes.

And because the West did not lose in the end, there were relatively few

angry postwar recriminations among the allies. NATO did not after all disintegrate. Washington was bolstered in its conviction of the 1990s that alliances enhance rather than diminish the effectiveness of the world's sheriff. Clinton, misunderstanding the specificity of this war to Europe, was so buoyed by the outcome that for a brief moment he even sought to generalize the lesson into a Clinton doctrine of humanitarian warfare that could apply to Africa too.[4] The Republican right that had tried to turn post–Cold War NATO into a support group for U.S. operations in the Mideast dropped this demand as it became obvious that the alliance would have its hands full closer to home for decades to come. The French-British defense rapprochement at St. Malo last year did not combine with revived anti-European instincts among German conservatives to shunt Berlin aside and renationalize European security relations in a new great-power contest. The EU, though shocked by the stark evidence of its continued dependence on U.S. technology and leadership, gained a profound sense of purpose in the formidable task of modernizing Southeastern Europe and cleaning up the debris of Ottoman as well as Communist rule. And Central European and Balkan neighbors that had joined the bandwagon to offer NATO their airfields or airspace on the wager that the alliance would eventually win were rewarded in the new Stability Pact with more Western money and attention than they had dreamed possible.

U.S. Leadership in Europe

Kosovo, it was widely noted, was a catalyst for a new transatlantic bargain and a more autonomous European role, variously described as that "common foreign and security policy," a "European security and defense identity," or a strengthened "European pillar" for NATO. More accurately, perhaps, the Kosovo crisis clarified the post–Cold War evolution that began the moment the Berlin Wall fell, but was only dimly perceived in the mid-1990s.

Thus, while it became a cliché after the Soviet collapse to say that the United States was the world's sole remaining superpower, the size of the military and leadership gap between the United States and its European allies that Kosovo revealed still shocked the Europeans. With its precision bombs and missiles, the United States was already far advanced in the celebrated revolution in military affairs. It had abundant satellite intelligence that it refused to share with its allies. It could use this intelligence for real-time targeting—and it largely ignored its allies in deciding on those targets. The fiction of delegating daily targeting authority to NATO's secretary-general was an artful way to bridge U.S. frustration at target setting by a committee of nineteen and European frustration at being shut out from

decisions, but it hardly veiled the reality of U.S. command.

Nor would the European allies have been able, for sheer lack of military hardware, to act on America's centimeter-accurate intelligence images had they seen them. The Europeans provided few of the 1,100 aircraft used in the air strikes, an even smaller percentage of the 23,000 bombs and missiles, and hardly any of the 7,000-plus precision-guided munitions. Maj. Gen. Klaus Naumann, inspector general of the Bundeswehr and then chairman of NATO's Military Committee in the mid-1990s, had for years been warning about the increasing transatlantic gap in capability. Now the evidence of the disparity was painfully obvious to everyone.[5] "Kosovo was two or three sizes too big for us," observes a senior German diplomat ruefully.

The equally painful corollary was that there could be no substitute for U.S. leadership. Washington's demonstrated willingness to fire its high-tech weapons conferred an unparalleled credibility on U.S. deeds and words. Milosevic had nothing but scorn for the economic embargoes or credits that constituted the EU's main tool. Europe's weaker sanctions or cajoling could not deflect him from exceeding agreed ceilings on his military and paramilitary forces in Kosovo in late 1998 and starting ethnic cleansing in February 1999. Ever since the Clinton administration reengaged the United States in the Balkans issue at the Dayton Conference in 1995, the Europeans have known that without the United States they are helpless in their own Balkan backyard. They have contemplated no move in the region without U.S. participation. The sole exception, the Italian-led pacification of anarchic Albania in 1997, was in essence less a restoration of law and order than a glorified evacuation of northwestern European nationals out of harm's way.

NATO's brush with near failure in Kosovo in the spring of 1999 thus only emphasized European impotence in any robust peacemaking. Europe's leaders looked over the abyss of what might have happened had Milosevic hung on for four more weeks and shuddered. He might well have burst the strained NATO solidarity, alienated the United States from Europe, left Kosovo refugees as a time bomb in Albania and Macedonia over the winter, filled the emptied Kosovar houses with Serb settlers, and demonstrated to other local bullies that violence does pay in a complacent Europe.

America's unique credibility in deterrence therefore remains indispensable for preservation of stability in Europe. And so does the United States role as *primus inter pares,* for the same reasons that required U.S. engagement when NATO was founded half a century ago. Washington's ultimate nuclear deterrence may no longer be central. But U.S. leadership in European security continues to be the only device for avoiding leadership by the richest, most populous, and most energetic country in Europe, Germany. And no non-German—and no German in public life today—wishes to repeat the experiments of 1870, 1914, and 1939, even with the convinced

democrats of contemporary Germany.

Moreover, whatever the frustrations for the other partners, the structural leadership of one country is often essential to force closure on policy debates in the alliance. After (or sometimes before) due deliberation among allies, only the United States can end debate and compel a decision to act. And, as the crucial last stages of the Kosovo settlement showed yet again, only the United States possesses the authority to commit the entire alliance to an agreement in tough bilateral negotiations with the still-nuclear Russians. "The USA is in a weight class of its own, a super heavyweight," Fischer told *Der Spiegel* interviewers who were trying to goad him into describing Europe as a foreign-policy rival to the United States. "The Europeans are in the process of forming, gradually, out of various lighter classes, [only] a heavy middleweight."[6]

The final distinctive characteristic of the United States as leader of NATO, perhaps, is the reassurance U.S. dominance provides for the new democracies in Central Europe. Poland, the largest of the three freshman members admitted to the alliance two weeks before the war in Kosovo began, would have been leery of entrusting its security to an alliance led by Germany. And without tacit U.S. oversight, Poland would also have been reluctant to accept reconciliation and a beneficial special relationship with Germany as it did in the early 1990s. The Poles' faith in America may be the extreme example, but it represents a phenomenon common to Central Europeans. By popular acclaim in the region, NATO is already the core of hard security in post-Cold War Europe, and both the new democracies that hope to join the alliance soon and those that qualify only for NATO's looser Partnership for Peace are striving above all for close association with U.S. power.

What special niche then remains for the Europeans in European security? This is the question that Kosovo is forcing the EU to face before it is ready to do so. Originally the EU had intended to postpone difficult decisions on common foreign and security policy until after it had met its three major precursor challenges: launching the euro, agreeing on the controversial institutional and agricultural reforms that are urgently needed to prevent paralysis or insolvency of an enlarging EU, and preparing for the first round of admissions of new Central European members early in the next century. Instead, this spring the EU—including even its neutral members—was suddenly required for the first time in its history to approve a NATO military operation. The EU at summit level complied, and went on to absorb the security tasks of the orphan Western European Union; to transform the French-German-Belgian-Spanish-Luxembourg Eurocorps into Europe's first joint rapid-reaction force; to name as the EU's new Commission president and first foreign-policy spokesman the political heavyweights of Romano Prodi and Javier Solana; to commit almost five times as many European

troops to Kosovo peacekeeping as the U.S. contingent; and to meet the lion's share of the political, economic, and social development costs in the Balkans over the next ten years.[7]

Expectations differ about just how fast these initiatives might evolve into an authentic European voice in foreign policy. The most ambitious cheerleaders—who are found more often on op-ed pages than in government chanceries—call for emancipation from U.S. hegemony.[8] This thesis is dramatic and easy to grasp and seems well on its way to becoming conventional wisdom in U.S. commentary on the mood in Europe.[9]

It is, however, unrepresentative of the more somber and urgent attempts by Europe's major governments to achieve just the opposite goal in the wake of Kosovo—that is, to keep an increasingly inward-looking United States engaged in Europe. Their means to this end is to fortify their joint military capabilities and strengthen political will to prove that Europe will help relieve the United States of the residual burden of guaranteeing European security, a burden that Washington still carries ten years after the end of the Cold War. The first step in this process is that Europe has conspicuously assumed the main responsibility both for NATO's Kosovo Forces (KFOR) and for the long-term Southeastern Stability Pact for economic development in the Balkans as a whole.

European Security and Defense Identity

To prevent the present transatlantic gap in capacity from widening and rendering them incapable even of fighting alongside the United States in the future, the Europeans must now make major changes in military procurement, in the configuration of their forces, and, for those that do not yet have professional armed forces, in conscription. Christoph Bertram, director of the Berlin-based Science and Policy Foundation, summarizes the first need: "We want to keep up sufficiently to make interoperability possible and avoid a division of labor in which the US provides the air power at 15,000 feet and the Europeans provide the body bags on the ground." Yet to achieve such "interoperability," a laggard Europe will have to overtake a moving target; in response to the disappointing constraints on sorties imposed by storms in the early phase of the Kosovo war, the United States is now redoubling its own efforts to produce versatile all-weather aircraft with all-weather weapons dependent only on the satellite Global Positioning System and preprogrammed laser guidance, and not on shifting cloud cover.

The second need—to alter troop configuration—arises from the changed nature of the threat. During the Cold War, large divisions with heavy firepower were required to hold NATO territory against the kind of massed at-

tack planned in Soviet military doctrine. In the decade following the end of the Cold War and shrinkage of the Russian army, however, the main danger has come from aggression by local despots on the periphery of heartland Europe. The military response that is required here, should diplomacy fail, is "rapid reaction" by more mobile and lightly armed forces, on the pattern of the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division. Britain and France have begun this shift; others are only beginning to catch up.

The third imperative is as strong, and as awkward, as the first two in the minds of officials. It follows from the probable dispatch of rapid reaction forces outside the strict NATO treaty area to the EU periphery; only volunteers, and not draftees, can be sent to these zones.[10]

If there is any one blueprint that is currently driving thinking on defense reform in France and Germany—and therefore in the EU as a whole—it is a new essay by Francois Heisbourg, "L'Europe de la defense dans l'Alliance atlantique."[11] For the most part, Heisbourg ties into a coherent package recommendations that have been circulating in the strategic community for two decades. He adds the shock of Kosovo and "the three years of humiliation of Europe in Bosnia," however, to argue that it is now urgent to convert these recommendations into policy.

As the title indicates in embedding a "Europe of defense" in the Atlantic alliance, this is no Gaullist tract. Heisbourg contends that it is highly desirable to keep the U.S. superpower engaged in Europe—and that only a stronger Europe pulling its weight can attract Washington's flagging attention in the post–Cold War world. He repeats the British-French appeal at St. Malo in calling on Europeans to increase and focus defense spending to give themselves the "credible military means" they now lack to police their own continent as necessary. He deplores the fact that a rich Europe, allocating a combined $145 billion, or 55 percent of the U.S. defense budget of $264 billion, gets such a paltry return on this investment. It manages to spend only half as much as the United States on procurement and only a third as much on indispensable research and development, he complains. Moreover, even with 1.9 million soldiers in uniform, 500,000 more than the United States has, Europe can field only 2 percent of this number as today's essential rapid-reaction forces. That is barely enough to meet Europe's present commitments to KFOR and SFOR (Stabilization Forces) in Kosovo and Bosnia, with no reserves.

Heisbourg's proposed remedies are to nudge Germany and Italy to adopt professional armed forces; to improve Europe's institutional ability to respond swiftly to crisis and to make disparate national defense policies more supportive of intervention; to acquire needed satellite surveillance, military electronics, heavy airlift, precision-guided weapons, and more versatile aircraft; to restructure European defense industry to establish two or three

large producers that would be competitive worldwide; to spend more on equipment and merge national weapons acquisition into a pan-European procurement agency that could correct today's wasteful duplication and take advantage of economies of scale; and to internationalize bids (on the condition that "Fortress America" also opens its procurement to non-Americans). Even without raising taxes, he contends, these measures could give Europe much more bang for the euro.

Some French and British officials, reflecting their countries' tradition of power projection, entertain even grander hopes of forging a pan-European intervention force. "There is a great divergence of views," comments a German diplomat:

> France could imagine operations in Africa. ... Spain obviously is pushing security and defense policy because it thinks [a European crisis force] could sometimes be used in its area.
>
> The French vision is quite clear. They want the rubber-stamp model. They want the EU foreign ministers to assemble and say, "We think the EU should be prepared to take military action in X or Y." Then there would be a small coalition of the willing. Then they would do the job and come back six months later and tell the amazed ministers of state, "Job done. Mission accomplished."
>
> The British view is a little bit like France's, only the European foreign ministers assemble and ask *NATO* to do the military action. Then six months later [NATO Supreme Allied Commander for Europe] Wesley Clark reports back, "Job done. Mission accomplished."

The equally painful corollary was that there could be no substitute for U.S. leadership.

Germany's position, the diplomat continued, is in-between: "What we have in mind really is something more flexible. We would need at least a steering mechanism where such a military operation could be steered on a day-to-day basis under priorities set by the European Union, and you would have optional forces to do the actual fighting. I can see NATO would do a lot of the logistics, planning, transportation," while the EU would provide the combat troops.

In Berlin's view, a colleague adds, any common military action would have to be authorized not by some French, British, and German directorate, but only by a large coalition of the willing, including a substantial number of the smaller nations in the EU. Neither Germany nor such a large coalition, it is clear, would approve operations outside the European continent.

That officials now dare to float ambitious projects—French defense minister Alain Richard, for one, wants Europe to create a "defense union," com-

plete with a European General Staff that would be independent of U.S. command—illustrates the unleashing of the European defense imagination after Kosovo.[12] German generals no longer protest—as they did when the Eurocorps forerunner, the French-German brigade, was sprung on them by politicians in the mid-1980s—that multinational units can never work when the imperial general staff would not deign to mix even the military cultures of German-speaking Saxons and Bavarians in the same company. Nor does anyone ask, as some did when the Berlin Wall fell, if members of the European Community might not still revert to the habits of the previous two millennia and once more resort to battle against each other. There are no serious challenges now to the principle that Europeans should be able to borrow U.S. NATO assets for operations without direct U.S. participation, under the Combined Joint Task Force guidelines painstakingly worked out in NATO in the mid-1990s.

Many U.S. critics fault European priorities.

In this new climate much of the old hesitation about folding the Western European Union into the EU has also vanished. Today there are virtually no objections among neutral EU members to this consolidation. Given Milosevic's provocation, they had no qualms about joining with EU members that are also members of NATO in endorsing Western military action in Yugoslavia last March, even in the absence of a prior mandate by the United Nations (UN) Security Council or the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As long ago as the Amsterdam summit in 1997, Finland and Sweden called for a pan-European "crisis-management" army (to act under UN or OSCE auspices), and Finnish prime minister Paavo Lipponen has recently renewed the appeal. Ireland's neutrality was always instrumental in any case, intended primarily to distance Dublin from London, and is now obsolescent. That leaves Austria, whose attachment to neutrality is also instrumental in distancing Vienna from Berlin and in giving the big consensus parties something to quarrel about domestically. "There are no neutrals any more," a German diplomat concludes.

Discussing the EU's assumption of an overt defense role, he continues, "Of course the big problem is, how do you make sure that countries like Turkey" don't veto EU action by blocking use of NATO assets? "Turkey is close to a lot of trouble spots that may call for European crisis reaction." Yet Ankara, as a veteran member of NATO but a rebuffed applicant for EU membership, might well try to trade off its veto power on release of NATO assets to extract a higher status in the EU queue.

Skeptics of a European security and defense identity point to other prob-

lems as well. While they are astonished that NATO and EU allies hung together for eleven weeks of air strikes in Yugoslavia (and that France under President Jacques Chirac dropped its old affinity for Serbs), they do not expect such exemplary solidarity to survive the Kosovo emergency. They doubt the efficacy of crisis management by committee when there is no single dominant partner to force decisions. They anticipate the resurgence of rival assertions of national advantage and recall all the vain pleas to Italy a few years back not to pay Milosevic's cronies $950 million for a share in the privatization of Yugoslavia's telecommunications.[13] For all the remarkable surrender of sovereignty by the merging European nation-states to date, they scoff at the notion that the Europeans might actually pool their armies as they have pooled their currencies. And even in more modest regional foreign policy that falls short of that ultimate commitment of blood, many U.S. critics fault European priorities. The Europeans, they object, are concentrating far too much on parochial issues of reshuffling EU institutions and are neglecting the more necessary swift admission of fledgling Central European democracies to membership in the club.

Despite all the brave talk, many Europeans too remain highly doubtful about any development of a pan-European crisis-reaction force, even one borrowing U.S. NATO assets. By now Europeans are persuaded that they are permanent allies, that they do not need to fear each other or recidivism to their constant nationalistic contests of the past. But there is still a long way to go to translate that conviction into a pan-European rationalization of defense efforts, or into a Dutch decision that the Netherlands doesn't need a tiny air force when Germany has a bigger and better one, or into British reliance on Belgian ammunition, which Brussels withheld during the Gulf War.

Nor are voters eager to forfeit the "peace dividend" of sharply reduced defense budgets they have enjoyed since the end of the Cold War, no matter how humiliated the narrow foreign-policy elites feel. The most crucial country, Germany—which would have to finance any new French reconnaissance satellite or serious defense research and development or any major advance in laser-guided munitions or electronic countermeasures—is already feeling strapped. Its sluggish economy is the main reason for this year's fall of the euro against the dollar. The Germans are grumbling about the belt tightening and structural change the government of Gerhard Schröder is finally demanding of them in order to render Germany fit for the globalized competition of the information age. Ironically, no sooner had Germany finally broken the post-World War II taboos to join its allies in sending combat troops outside the NATO perimeter in Kosovo than the Bundeswehr had its budget slashed by more than 8 percent, down from the DM 48 billion originally guaranteed for next year to DM 45 billion, with a further drop to

DM 44 billion ordered by 2003. [14] Far from allowing the planned expansion of the key German rapid reaction forces from 36,000 to 50,000—the number deemed essential to allow rotation and meet Germany's promised commitment of troops to KFOR—these budget cuts may force the Defense Ministry to dissolve some existing divisions. And that would certainly leave no extra funds for military research or satellites.

Common Foreign and Security Policy

While a robust European military capability remains a distant goal, then, the governments' more immediate focus is on the soft power of diplomacy, economic incentives, and agenda setting. Even as they utter brave words about a new "security identity," new weapons, and a new army, European foreign ministries will most likely have to settle instead for incremental enhancement of their joint stance abroad in a "common foreign and security policy" (CFSP in English and PESC in French; GASP is the unfortunate German acronym).

This common policy actually began with tentative "European political cooperation" in the 1970s and had its first success in the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in setting a CSCE-wide standard of minimum human rights. For the first time, verbal meddling by signatories of the Helsinki treaty in each others' domestic treatment of minorities and dissidents was legitimized. It led to the founding of Helsinki committees in the Soviet bloc, as elsewhere, and it contributed greatly to the eventual breakup of the Soviet bloc and of the Soviet Union itself.

Basically, the goal of a more audacious "common foreign and security policy" written into the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 has mostly remained a pious hope. Its realization has lagged far behind the quantum leaps in the economics of forging a real single market and currency union, in the far-reaching legal supranationalism exercised by the European Court of Justice, or even in the barely institutionalized but powerful setting of pan-European norms for the environment. The interests of France in the Arab and African worlds, of Britain in the Falklands, of Italy in the Mediterranean, and of everyone in the Balkans, have remained too diverse until now to combine in any agreed purpose. During the Cold War, these conflicting impulses were rigidly kept in bounds by the compulsion to subordinate all else to the need to deter Soviet blackmail from Moscow's massed divisions in East Germany. As the Cold War ended, however, the innate centrifugal energies were loosed; in the 1990s they counteracted to some extent the opposing centripetal energies of globalization and European monetary union.

Despite the flowery words, then, European foreign policy has so far remained stubbornly "intergovernmental," with heads of government negotiating compromises anew at each summit; foreign policy has never developed its own dynamic within the day-to-day machinery of EU operations and consultations.[15] Even the activist Javier Solana as the first "Monsieur PESC" is not going to pry decision making away from national capitals any time soon. Well into the next century, he and each of his successors will be only the foreign-policy spokesman and not, as numerous media reports would have it, the czar.

That said, Solana will surely maximize the use of his small, new, analytical and planning staff to carve out a significant role as an agenda setter and facilitator in EU foreign policy. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force last May, vests him with such competence. And with his years of experience as NATO secretary-general, he possesses unparalleled knowledge of how to play both of the Brussels institutions that have hitherto shunned each other but must now work together to maintain stability in the expanding West European system of peace and prosperity.[16] He is trusted by Washington, and he should be able to minimize French and Greek suspicion of NATO. The Amsterdam Treaty's provision for foreign-policy decision making by "qualified majority voting" rather than unanimity once a basic policy direction has been agreed should also help Solana mobilize support for common action.

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Even more important, perhaps, the demanding hands-on task the Europeans have set themselves of establishing modern governance, order, justice, tolerance, and civil society in the Balkans in the coming decade will compel them to work together in new ways. A novel framework for cooperation by regional entities will have to be invented that bypasses the ill-functioning Yugoslav state, or at least finesses the relevance of it for estranged Kosovo and Montenegro. International representatives in the protectorate of Kosovo (and perhaps in the fragile states of Albania and Macedonia) will have to solve the conundrum of how rich intervening powers can provide emergency interim administrations without sapping local initiative and seriously distorting development through their sheer flood of wealth and temptation of corruption. The ad hoc mix of civil servants and policemen recruited around the globe by a dozen different organizations must learn to cooperate with rather than sabotage each other and, as the former EU administrator to Mostar, Hans Koschnik, colorfully puts it, develop the ability to keep all the fleas in the sack.[17] CFSP (as well as the vaunted rewriting of NATO's "strategic con-

cept") will now consist of turning practice into theory.

For all the problems it creates, the Balkan project now provides the unifying mission that has thus far been missing in the European enterprise. In unexpected ways it galvanized the new-left governments to reaffirm the operational centrality of the values the EU and NATO have espoused for half a century. It broadened their concept of post-nationalism within the narrow club of the EU to apply to Europe as a whole and qualified the old Westphalian reverence for the sovereignty of the nation-state by the new international law of human-rights conventions.[18] As events played out, they gave the European actors new confidence that they could stick together in a difficult trial and that they could be effective within the Western alliance in starting the process of bringing Russia back into dialogue, in securing a UN mandate for justified Western military action, in converting a potentially messy U.S. use of force against international oil tankers to a broad voluntary oil embargo on Yugoslavia, and in attacking the roots as well as the manifestation of war in the daring development project of the Southeast European Stability Pact. To judge by opinion polls, the determination of European governments even inspired in voters a certain emotional sense of a European identity that has previously been conspicuous by its absence.[19]

All this may not yet give Europe the passion of the American city on the hill for constitutional rather than ethnic identity. As founding myths for nascent imagined communities go, though, it's not a bad start.

Notes

1. This was a major point in Foreign Minister Fischer's presentation before the Bundestag vote approving deployment of 8,500 German soldiers to join KFOR by an overwhelming 505 to 11, with 12 abstentions. See "Bundestag stimmt Bundeswehr-Mission" (Bundestag approves Bundeswehr mission), *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* June 12, 1999, p. 1.
2. Speech on June 21, 1999 at the XVIth International NATO Workshop in Vienna, available at http://www.nato.int/. Significantly, Solana too was an earlier opponent of America's Vietnam War and even an eloquent opponent of his native Spain's entry into NATO in the 1980s.
3. The editor of *Liberation,* Jacques Almaric, wrote on June 23, 1999, for example, "[T]his sick Serbia and its demons must be Europeanized, just as Kosovo must be Europeanized, in order for all its inhabitants to overcome their hatreds and turn their attention to matters other than vengeance." On the same day the Danish daily *Aktuelt* wrote, "[T]here are some virtues that must be defended with weapons. One of them is the right of a group of people to defend itself against violence of Kosovo proportions. That was the basic reason we established NATO. After the Berlin Wall's fall, it [is now becoming] a real pan-European security organization." "Western Press Review," *Radio Free Europe,* June 23, 1999, available online at http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/.
4. Jim Hoagland, "Kosovos to Come," *Washington Post,* June 27, 1999, p. B7.

5. See, for example, "Schwindende Bedeutung reiner Territorialverteidigung" (Disappearing meaning of pure territorial defense), *Neue Zürcher Zeitung,* June 17, 1999; William Drozdiak, "War Showed U.S.-Allied Inequality Arms Gap May Alter Roles of NATO States," *Washington Post,* June 28, 1999, p. A1; and "Frankreichs Kosten im Kosovo-Krieg," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung,* July 3, 1999.
6. "'Es gab nie ein Alternative,'" *Der Spiegel* 25 (June 21,1999): 34ff.
7. "Wiederbelebung des Eurokorps" (Revitalization of the Eurocorps), *Neue Zürcher Zeitung,* May 31, 1999.
8. See, for example, the running coverage in *Der Spiegel.* See also articles like Bernd Ulrich, "Amerikas Krieg, Europas Frieden" (America's war, Europe's peace), *Tagesspiegel,* June 5, 1999; and Manfred Bissinger, "Schröder im Glück" (Schroder is lucky), *Die Woche,* June 11, 1999, p. 1. This view reads Kosovo as a second Iraq, with Washington pushing reluctant allies into committing acts of war and turning NATO into the world's policeman, and with Europe winning the peace through its special negotiator, Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari. For one refutation of this view as "grotesque," see Stefan Cornelius, "Der gute und der böse Polizist" (The good and the bad cop), *Süddeutsche Zeitung,* June 12, 1999, p. 4. German defense minister Rudolf Scharping emphatically rejects this view as well, arguing that "We do not have too much America in NATO, but too little Europe." Interview, "Ran an Milosevics Vermögen" (Get at Milosevic's property), *Die Woche,* June 11, 1999, pp. 6f.
9. See, for example, William Pfaff, "While Europe Dithers, NATO Advances Eastward," *International Herald Tribune,* June 24, 1999; "Reality Check: Success Has Its Costs," by the Nixon Center's Peter Rodman, and "Peace in Yugoslavia: Who Gains?" by Alan Rousso, Director of the Carnegie Endowment's Moscow Center. The latter two are available respectively in David Johnson Lists no. 3362 (June 26, 1999) and no. 3364 (June 27, 1999), available by electronic mail from davidjohnson@erols.com. Rodman states, "Where the Administration sees [in Kosovo] vindication for the Atlantic Alliance, for U.S. leadership, and for universal values, the rest of the world now sees America's dominance as one of the world's biggest problems. The Europeans are only accelerating the construction of their autonomous institutions in foreign and security policy, vowing never again to be so tied to the Americans."
10. Among EU members, France, Portugal, and Spain will soon follow the long-standing British example and shift to a career army by 2003. That leaves Denmark, Germany, Greece, and Italy with conscription. So far any notion of professional armed forces has been anathema in the linchpin country of Germany; the draft has been too valuable as an educator in socializing West German youth in the sixties and seventies and east German youth in the nineties away from authoritarianism to egalitarian democracy.
11. In *Politique Etrangere* no. 2 (Summer 1999). Heisbourg is president of the Center for Security Policy in Geneva.
12. "Europa braucht einen militärischen Führungsstab" (Europe needs a military general staff), *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* June 18, 1999.
13. Charles P. Wallace, "Going for Broke," *Time,* April 26, 1999, p. 42.
14. Karl Feldmeyer, "Eine neue Ratlosigkeit," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* June 25, 1999.
15. The best single treatment of the conspicuous "capabilities-expectations gap" here and of the growing pressures on Europe to operate as a coherent trading bloc in the world is probably John Peterson and Helene Sjursen, *A Common Foreign Policy for*

Europe? (London: Routledge, 1998).

16. For American advocacy of close cooperation between the two, see Robert Hunter, "Maximizing NATO: A relevant alliance knows how to reach," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 3 (May/June 1999): 190-203.

17. The germinal paper outlining Europe's tasks in the Balkans calls for, among other things, a customs union in the region, adoption of a common currency like the euro, and, most controversially, a zero-tariff free market in the EU for imports from Southeastern Europe, including such sensitive items as agriculture, textiles, and steel. See "A System for Post-War South-East Europe," Brussels Center for European Policy Studies Working Document 131, Revision 4, May 3, 1999. Policymakers are well aware of the enormity of the task they have set themselves and hope to avoid the mistake made in Bosnia-Herzogovina. For one description of the problems in Bosnia, see Gordon N. Bardos, "The Bosnian Cold War," *Harriman Review* 11, no. 3 (April 1999): 1-26.

18. Geremek, citing the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1949 Geneva Convention on Human Rights, told the Warsaw EU Chamber of Commerce on June 9, 1999, "The political message from the Kosovo operation is that the international community should consider human rights as a main part of international law. ... With the Kosovo crisis the identity of Europe is put in doubt. The very sense of European identity is the respect of the human person." And therefore "European solidarity should find expression" in the Balkan part of Europe too. Similarly, German defense minister Scharping told visiting Americans that human rights could override sovereignty under a 1992 UN Security Council decision and under a 1994 European parliament resolution. "We are only sovereign in common" in the EU, he declared, and not as individual countries. Group interview, Bonn, June 2, 1999.

    For a contrary view that elevating human rights conventions to international law without UN Security Council sanction in every case risks a reversion to pre-Westphalian wars of religion, see Hermann Weber, "Auf dem Weg zu einem neuen Völkerrecht?" (On the way to a new international law?), *Neue Zürcher Zeitung,* July 7, 1999.

19. According to the opinion survey institute Ipsos, in mid-May Europeans approved NATO's military intervention in Yugoslavia by 53 percent to 41 percent against, with approval ratings highest in Britain (67 percent), France (62 percent), Germany (54 percent), and Italy (51 percent). Disapproval surpassed approval in Greece (97 percent), Portugal (51 percent), Spain (49 percent), and Belgium (45 percent). "Der Krieg" (The war), *Die Zeit,* June 2, 1999, p. 10. Dominique Moïsi, deputy director of the French Institute of International Relations, argues that the dismal turnout for European parliamentary elections of under 50 percent last June does not void the thesis that Kosovo was a "defining moment" for European sensibility. "The real Europe" is not in EU institutions, he maintains; rather, an "American-type revolution" is occurring, and "real powers and issues lie elsewhere than the political realm." "Sensibility and Apathy," *Financial Times,* June 28, 1999, p. 16.

    One German columnist discerned "something like a European patriotism" in the reaction to Kosovo. Thomas Schmid, "Sieger Milosevic?" (Winner Milosevic?) *Die Welt,* June 12, 1999, p. 10. For other interpretations in the German press of the sea change wrought by Kosovo, see Christoph Bertram, "Vier Lehren für den Westen" (Four lessons for the West), *Die Zeit,* June 10, 1999, p. 4; and Dan Diner, "Ein Schüsselergebnis" (A key event), *Die Zeit,* June 10, 1999, p. 45f.