|
||
| T h e C e n t e r f o r S t r a t e g i c a n d I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s | ||
|
||
| |
|
|
|
|
||
| |
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
In this issue . . . EDITORIALS
|
|
|
||||
|
Feature - Zalmay Khalilzad and Daniel Byman |
|||||
|
Afghanistan: The Consolidation of a Rogue State Excerpt:
Afghanistan has gone from one of Washington's greatest foreign policy triumphs to one of its most profound failures. During the Cold War, U.S. support to the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance resulted in a debacle for Moscow, humiliating the vaunted Red Army and discrediting the Soviets throughout the Muslim world. After the Soviets withdrew, however, Afghanistan has become a disaster for U.S. policy. The master terrorist ÔUsama bin Laden has taken shelter in Afghanistan, using it as a base to indoctrinate and train militants who strike at the United States and its allies. Afghan women face a horrifying array of restrictions, among the most repressive in the world. The country is now the world's leading producer of opium, which in turn is used to produce heroin. These problems, however, are only symptoms of a more dangerous disease. Though policymakers are loathe to say it openly, Afghanistan is ruled by a rogue regime, the Taliban. The outrages that draw headlines in the West stem from its misrule and will continue as long as the movement dominates Afghanistan. If anything, the danger is growing. "Talibanism" -- a radical, backward, and repressive version of Islam similar to the Saudi "Wahhabi" credo but rejected by the vast majority of Muslims worldwide -- is gaining adherents outside Afghanistan and spreading to other countries in the region. Acting now is essential. The Taliban has consolidated its influence in Afghanistan over the last five years. Soon the movement will be too strong to turn away from rogue behavior. It will gain more influence with insurgents, terrorists, and narcotics traffickers and spread its abusive ideology throughout the region. Unfortunately, the Clinton administration has ignored the challenge of the Taliban. Some administration officials tacitly favored the group when it emerged between 1994 and 1995, underestimating the threat it posed to regional stability and to U.S. interests. Officials in the State Department and other concerned bureaucracies have too few resources with which to oppose the movement. Their admonitions have little influence with regional states or the Taliban. More important, they operate in a policy vacuum. U.S. concerns about human rights, drugs, and terrorism are not coordinated as part of an overall strategy for protecting U.S. interests in the region. Afghanistan policy drifts according to the political concerns of the moment, without a comprehensive strategy to guide our actions. Protecting U.S. interests and stopping the spread of "Talibanism" require confronting the Taliban and preventing it from consolidating power. Alternatives to confrontation have little promise. Continued neglect leaves the United States with little influence over the Taliban. Washington must weaken the Taliban, support moderate Afghans, and press Afghanistan's neighbors, particularly Pakistan, to work against extremism in the region. Once the Taliban is weaker, it will be more amenable to peaceful resolution of the civil war, adhering to international norms regarding the treatment of women and minorities, and refraining from supporting radicalism abroad. Success, however, requires elevating the importance of Afghanistan at home, ensuring that the U.S. policy is coordinated and has sufficient resources. . . . Download the full article, available in Adobe Acrobat [.pdf] format.
|
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
 |
The Washington Quarterly |
|
|
